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1 Introduction
In Bayesian epistemology, the problem of the priors is this: How should we
set our credences (or degrees of belief) in the absence of evidence? That is,
how should we set our prior or initial credences, the credences with which
we begin our credal life? David Lewis liked to call an agent at the beginning
of her credal journey a superbaby.1 The problem of the priors asks for the
norms that govern these superbabies.
The Principle of Indifference gives a very restrictive answer. It demands
that such an agent divide her credences equally over all possibilities. That
is, according to the Principle of Indifference, only one initial credence func-
tion is permissible, namely, the uniform distribution. In this paper, we offer
a novel argument for the Principle of Indifference. I call it the Argument from
Accuracy.
The Argument from Accuracy shares much in common with Jim Joyce’s
“nonpragmatic vindication” of Probabilism [Joyce, 1998]. Thus, in section
2, I introduce the Argument from Accuracy by first sketching a very re-
stricted version of Joyce’s argument for Probabilism; then, drawing on the
framework introduced for that first sketch, I sketch an equally restricted
version of my Argument from Accuracy. This will allow us to see the main
∗I would like to thank a number of people for helpful discussion of earlier versions of
this paper: Lara Buchak, Teddy Groves, Jim Joyce, Jason Konek, Juergen Landes, Katie
Steele, and Jon Williamson, as well as anonymous referees for this journal. I was supported
by ERC Starting Grant EUT during my work on this paper.
†Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Cotham House, Bristol, UK. BS6 6JL.
1Alan Ha´jek reports that he first heard Lewis use the term in an undergraduate lecture
at Princeton in the late 1980s [Ha´jek, ms].
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philosophical ideas behind the argument so that we might compare it with
rival arguments for the Principle of Indifference in section 3 and so that we
might assess one of its central premises in section 4. In section 5, I lift the
restrictions: I generalise the argument and then strengthen it by weaken-
ing the assumptions it makes. In section 6, I consider how the Principle
of Indifference interacts with other norms that govern credences, such as
Probabilism, Regularity, and the Principal Principle. I conclude in section 7
with a brief discussion of language dependence.
2 The Argument from Accuracy
In this section, we consider an agent who entertains only two propositions,
A and B, which are exclusive and exhaustive. We represent such an agent’s
cognitive state at a given time in her credal life by her credence function at
that time: this is the function c that takes each proposition about which she
has an opinion—that is, A or B—and returns the real number that mea-
sures her degree of belief or credence in that proposition. By convention, we
represent minimal credence by 0 and maximal credence by 1.
2.1 Joyce’s argument for Probabilism
We will present Joyce’s argument for the following norm, which governs
such an agent:
(Prob2) At any time in an agent’s credal life, if she entertains
only A and B at that time, it ought to be the case that her cre-
dence function c at that time is such that
c(A) + c(B) = 1.
This amounts to the following pair of claims: as the agent’s credence in one
proposition rises, her credence in the other should fall by the same amount;
and when the agent has maximal credence in one proposition, she should
have minimal credence in the other. It is the strongest norm governing such
an agent that follows from Probabilism.
How do we establish (Prob2)? Joyce offers the following argument: It
is often said that the aim of full belief is truth. One way to make this pre-
cise is to say that the ideal doxastic state is that in which one believes every
true proposition about which one has an opinion, and one disbelieves ev-
ery false proposition about which one has an opinion. That is, the ideal
doxastic state is the omniscient doxastic state (relative to the set of proposi-
tions about which one has an opinion). Thus, if one entertains only A and
B, and A is true and B is false, then the omniscient doxastic state is that in
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which one believes A and disbelieves B. We might then measure how good
an agent’s doxastic state is by its proximity to this omniscient state.2
Joyce’s argument—as I will present it—is based on an analogous claim
about credences. We say that the ideal credal state is that in which one
assigns maximal credence (i.e. 1) to each true proposition about which one
has an opinion and minimal credence (i.e. 0) to each false proposition about
which one has an opinion. By analogy with the doxastic case, we might call
this the omniscient credal state (relative to the set of propositions about which
she has an opinion). Given a possible world w, we let vw be the omniscient
credence function at w. Thus:
• If A is true and B is false at w, we have: vw(A) = 1; vw(B) = 0.
• If A is false and B is true at w, we have: vw(A) = 0; vw(B) = 1.
We then measure how good an agent’s credal state is by its proximity to
the omniscient state. Following Joyce, we call this the gradational accuracy
of the credal state (or, to abbreviate, its accuracy). To do this, we need a
measure of distance between credence functions. Many different measures
will do the job, but in this sketch of the argument I will focus on the most
popular, namely, Squared Euclidean Distance.3 Suppose c and c′ are two
credence functions defined for propositions A and B only. Then define the
Squared Euclidean Distance between them as follows:
Q(c, c′) := |c(A)− c′(A)|2 + |c(B)− c′(B)|2
That is, to obtain the distance between c and c′, we consider each propo-
sition on which they are defined; we take the difference between the cre-
dences they assign to that proposition; we square that difference; and we
sum the results. Thus, given a possible world w, the cognitive badness or
disvalue of a credence function c at w is given by its inaccuracy; that is, the
distance between c and vw, namely,
Q(vw, c) = |vw(A)− c(A)|2 + |vw(A)− c(B)|2
We call this the Brier score of c at w, and we write it B(c, w). So, if we mea-
sure distance using Squared Euclidean Distance, then the cognitive value
of c at w is the negative of the Brier score of c at w; that is, it is −B(c, w).
Thus, B is a measure of inaccuracy; −B is a measure of accuracy.
With this measure of cognitive value in hand, Joyce argues for Proba-
bilism by appealing to a standard norm of traditional decision theory:
(Dominance) Suppose O is a set of options,W is the set of pos-
sible worlds, and U is a measure of the value of the options in
O at the worlds inW . Suppose o, o′ in O. Then we say that
2See [Easwaran, ms] for a fascinating description of the consequences of such an account
of full beliefs.
3 In fact, Joyce considers a broad range of distance measures; in Section 5.2, we do too.
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(a) o strongly U-dominates o′ if U(o′, w) < U(o, w) for all worlds
w inW
(b) o weakly U-dominates o′ if U(o′, w) ≤ U(o, w) for all worlds
w inW and U(o′, w) < U(o, w) for at least one world w in
W .
Now suppose o, o′ in O and
(i) o strongly U-dominates o′;
(ii) There is no o′′ in O that weakly U-dominates o.
Then o′ is irrational.
Of course, in standard decision theory, the options are practical actions be-
tween which we wish to choose. But there is no reason why (Dominance)
or any other decision-theoretic norm can only determine the irrationality
of such options. They can equally be used to establish the irrationality of
accepting a particular scientific theory or, as we will see, the irrationality
of particular credal states. When they are put to use in the latter way, the
options are the possible credal states and the measure of value is −B, the
negative of the Brier score. Granted that, which credal states does (Domi-
nance) rule out? As the following theorem shows, it is precisely those that
violate (Prob2). This theorem is illustrated by Figure 2.1.
Theorem 1 For all credence functions c:
(I) If c violates (Prob2), then there is a credence function c∗ that satisfies (Prob2)
such that c∗ strongly Brier dominates c.
(II) If c satisfies (Prob2), then there is no credence function c∗ such c∗ weakly
Brier dominates c.
This, then, is Joyce’s argument for (Prob2):
(1) The cognitive value of a credence function is given by its proximity
to the ideal credence function:
(i) The ideal credence function at world w is the omniscient cre-
dence function at w, namely, vw.
(ii) Distance is measured by the Squared Euclidean Distance.
Thus, the cognitive value of a credence function at a world is given
by the negative of its Brier score at that world.
(2) (Dominance)
(3) Theorem 1
4
vw2
vw1
c
c∗
Figure 1: If a credence function is defined only on propositions A and B, we can
represent it by the point on the Cartesian plane that takes the credence assigned
to A as its x-coordinate and the credence assigned to B as its y-coordinate. Thus,
in the diagram, credence function c assigns 0.6 to both A and B, whereas credence
function c∗ assigns 0.5 to both. The two ideal credence functions in this situation
are vw1 and vw2 : the former is ideal at worlds at which A is false and B is true; the
latter at worlds at which A is true and B is false. The credence functions that satisfy
(Prob2) are the ones that lie on the line that joins vw1 and vw2 . Thus, since c lies
off this line, it violates (Prob2), while c∗ satisfies it. Having represented credence
functions in this way, a credence function has a greater Brier score at a world the
further the point that represents it lies from the point that represents that world’s
ideal credence function. It is clear by Pythagoras’ Theorem that c∗ lies closer to
vw1 than c does; and c
∗ lies closer to vw2 than c does. That is, c∗ strongly Brier
dominates c, as Theorem 1 demands.
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Therefore,
(4) (Prob2)
I wish to offer a similar style of argument in favour of the Principle of
Indifference. Here, I will state that argument in a restricted version that
attempts only to establish a particular instance of the Principle of Indiffer-
ence; it is the instance that applies to the sort of agent we’ve been consid-
ering in this section, namely, an agent with opinions about only the propo-
sitions A and B. Before we state the norm, we define a particular credence
function: let c0(A) = c0(B) = 0.5.
(PoI2) At the beginning of an agent’s credal life, if she entertains
only A and B, it ought to be the case that her credence function
is c0.
Note that this norm applies only to Lewis’ superbabies. This distinguishes
it from (Prob2), which applies to an agent at any time in her credal life.
I will retain Joyce’s first premises, (1)(i) and (1)(ii)—that is, his account
of cognitive value. But I will replace Dominance with an alternative norm
of decision theory, namely, the Minimax rule, which demands that an agent
at the beginning of her cognitive life choose one of the options that mini-
mizes its maximum (or worst-case) disutility.4 More precisely:
(Minimax) Suppose O is a set of options,W is a set of possible
worlds, and U is a measure of the value of the options in O at
the worlds inW . Suppose o, o′ in O. Then we say
(c) o worst-case dominates o′ with respect to U if the minimum
utility of o is greater than the minimum utility of o′. That
is,
min
w inW
U(o′, w) < min
w inW
U(o, w)
Now suppose o, o′ in O and
(i) o worst-case dominates o′
(ii) There is no o′′ in O such that o′′ worst-case dominates o
Then, for an agent at the beginning of her cognitive life, o′ is
irrational.
As above, note that the norm applies only to Lewis’ superbabies. This dis-
tinguishes it from the norm (Dominance) to which Joyce’s argument ap-
peals; (Dominance) applies to an agent at any time in her credal life.
4This norm is sometimes known as the Maximin rule, under which guise it demands
(equivalently) that an agent choose one of the options that maximises its minimum (or
worst-case) utility.
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Again, we ask: which credal states does (Minimax) rule out? This is
answered by the following theorem:
Theorem 2 Define c0 as follows: c0(A) = c0(B) = 0.5. Then, for all credence
functions c 6= c0 defined for A and B only,
max
w inW
B(c0, w) < max
w inW
B(c, w)
Equivalently,
min
w inW
−B(c, w) < min
w inW
−B(c0, w)
With this in hand, we can state the following argument for the particular
case of the Principle of Indifference we have been considering:
(1) The cognitive value of a credence function c and w is given by−B(c, w),
the negative of the Brier score of c at w.
(2) (Minimax)
(3) Theorem 2
Therefore,
(4) (PoI2)
Theorem 2 is a corollary of Theorem 4, which we state and prove below.
Figure 2 illustrates the theorem.
Thus, according to the Argument from Accuracy, what is wrong with
an agent who violates (PoI2) is that she risks greater inaccuracy than she
needs to risk. If she adopts c0, her inaccuracy in the worst-case scenario (as
measured by the Brier score) is 0.25. If instead she adopts c(A) = 0.2 and
c(B) = 0.8, for instance, her worst-case inaccuracy is 1.28. And similarly
for any other c 6= c0 (though with different numerical values): her worst-
case scenario if she opts for c is worse than the worst-case scenario of an
agent who opts for c0.
In section 5.1, we will generalise this argument by showing that it ap-
plies to agents with credences over larger sets of propositions than {A, B};
and in section 5.2, we will strengthen it by showing that the Principle of In-
difference still follows if we replace the Brier score with any of a vast array
of alternative measures of inaccuracy.
3 Existing justifications of the Principle of Indiffer-
ence
For the moment, I will continue to focus on this simple version of the Argu-
ment from Accuracy in order to assess it. First, I will show that it overcomes
7
vw2
vw1
c
c0
Figure 2: We represent credence functions on the Cartesian plane as above. As
above, c0(A) = c0(B) = 0.5. And c(A) = 0.2; c(B) = 0.8. The dashed line
represents the maximum distance of c0 from the omniscient credence function,
and thus the maximum disutility that c0 risks—it achieves that maximum at both
worlds. The dotted line, on the other hand, represents the maximum distance of
c from the omniscient credence function, and thus the maximum disutility that
c risks—it achieves that maximum when A is true and B is false. Clearly, the
maximum disutility risked by c is greater than the maximum disutility risked by
c0.
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the problems faced by the three main attempts to justify the Principle of In-
difference. Next, I will consider further problems that it may face. Thus,
throughout, we are considering a superbaby with opinions about only the
exclusive and exhaustive pair of propositions A and B.
3.1 The Argument from Evidential Support
The argument (cf. [White, 2009, §4.3]):
An agent ought to believe a proposition exactly to the extent
that her evidence supports it. A superbaby has no evidence.
An empty body of evidence supports a pair of exclusive and
exhaustive propositions equally. Therefore, our agent ought to
have equal credence in A and in B. In the presence of (Prob2),
this gives that our agent ought to adopt c0. Therefore, (PoI2).
First problem: Our best account of comparative evidential support—
namely, Bayesian confirmation theory—is given in terms of the effect of
evidence on a rational agent’s credences. So, in order to know that a body
of evidence supports two hypotheses equally, and thus to mobilise this ar-
gument, we already need to know all the principles that govern a ratio-
nal agent’s credences. Thus, we cannot establish the first premise of the
Argument from Evidential Support without already knowing whether the
Principle of Indifference is true or not. So the argument cannot be used to
adjudicate upon the truth of this principle.
Second problem: It is not clear why an agent should match her credence
to the evidential support in the way the first premise of this argument de-
mands. What good does she gain by doing this? Of course, one might hold
that responding correctly to the evidence is an irreducible, fundamental
cognitive good. The problem with this is that it cannot be the only such
good. As Alvin Goldman points out, if responding correctly to one’s evi-
dence were the only cognitive virtue, we would have no cognitive reason
to gather new evidence, since we could knowingly obtain maximal cog-
nitive value while in possession of a very impoverished evidential base
[Goldman, 2002, §3]; and I would do my students no cognitive harm by
making them believe false propositions about Kant’s life on the basis of
my testimony, given that they are justified in trusting me on such matters
[Goldman, 2002, §6]. Thus, even if responding correctly to one’s evidence
is a fundamental cognitive good, accuracy must be one too. But we then
have two fundamental cognitive goods that might come into conflict. Thus,
we will need an account of how they ought to be weighed against one an-
other. Of course, it is not impossible to give such an account, but it is a
burden that such a justification has to bear, while my alternative does not.
Indeed, one of the appealing features of the Argument from Accuracy is
that it is compatible with cognitive value monism, the view that there is only
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one source of cognitive value; it is compatible with the version of cogni-
tive value monism that Goldman dubs veritism, namely, that accuracy is
the only source of cognitive value. Cognitive value monism does not have
to say how competing cognitive values ought to be weighed, since it recog-
nises only one source of such value.
Now, it might be objected that, just as the good of having accurate cre-
dences cannot be reduced to the good of matching those credences to the
evidential support, so the good of matching credences to evidential support
cannot be reduced to the good of accuracy. That is, cognitive value monism
must be wrong. I see the Argument from Accuracy presented in this pa-
per as a part of a larger project to answer this worry. The aim is precisely
to show that we can establish important evidential norms by appealing
only to the good of accuracy, and thereby reduce the virtue of respond-
ing appropriately to the evidence to the virtue of accuracy. The Principle
of Indifference is one such norm—it says how an agent should respond in
the absence of evidence. I take this to be the project begun in [Joyce, 1998]
and continued by [Easwaran, 2013] and [Pettigrew, 2013]. One of the great
advantages of this view is its potential to unify explanation in epistemol-
ogy: all cognitive norms are justified and explained by appeal to a single
cognitive virtue, namely, accuracy.
3.2 The Argument from Minimal Information
The argument:
An agent’s credences ought to incorporate the information given
by her evidence, but no more. Thus, an agent with no evi-
dence ought to have credences that contain minimal informa-
tion. These are given by c0. Therefore, (PoI2).
There are two ways to make this argument:
(1) Assume as a normative principle that credences should incorporate
the information given by evidence, but no more. Then provide a
precise measure of the information contained in a set of credences
and show that the credences that incorporate minimal information
are those demanded by the Principle of Indifference.
This is Jaynes’ approach [Jaynes, 1957]. He appeals to Shannon’s mea-
sure of the information contained in a probability distribution: the
entropy of a distribution measures its lack of informational content.
[I]n making inferences on the basis of partial information
we must use that probability distribution which has max-
imum entropy subject to whatever is known. This is the
only unbiased assignment we can make; to use any other
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would amount to arbitrary assumption of information which
by hypothesis we do not have. [. . . ] The maximum entropy
distribution may be asserted for the positive reason that it is
uniquely determined as the one that is maximally noncom-
mittal with regard to missing information. [Jaynes, 1957,
623]
(2) Lay down conditions on a rule N that assigns to each body of evi-
dence S a unique set of credences N(S) that it is rational to have in
the presence of that evidence. Incorporate into these conditions one
that says that N(S) should not contain information beyond that con-
tained in S. Then show that only one rule satisfies those conditions
and that, when S is the empty body of evidence, N(S) is the set of
credences demanded by the Principle of Indifference.
This is the approach taken by Paris and Vencovska´ [Paris and Vencovska´, 1990].
They list amongst their conditions on N one that they gloss as
“N(S) should not make any assumptions beyond those con-
tained in S.” [Paris and Vencovska´, 1990, 185]
In both cases, the problem is the same: Neither argument tells us why it is
bad to have credences that incorporate more information than is demanded
by one’s evidence. Other things being equal, it is presumably better to have
more informative credences. Thus, if we are to minimise the informative-
ness of our credences as much as possible without violating our evidential
obligations, it must be because by adopting more informative credences we
risk something bad. What the Argument from Minimal Information lacks
in all its incarnations is an account of the badness we risk.
Of course, the Argument from Accuracy addresses this concern. What
one risks by adopting credences other than those mandated by (PoI2) is
greater inaccuracy. So, while having greater informational content is clearly
valuable (though not a fundamental good), if one has credences that encode
more informational content than one’s evidence demands, there will be a
world at which one’s inaccuracy is greater than the inaccuracy at any world
of the credences mandated by (PoI2). Thus, any gain in information content
comes with a risk attached. This is why we should minimise informational
content.
In sum: in order to save the Argument from Minimal Information, we
had to appeal to the claim that we ought not to risk greater-than-necessary
inaccuracy. But given that it is this claim that grounds the Argument from
Accuracy, surely it is better to dispense with the talk of informational con-
tent altogether and appeal to accuracy directly in our justification of (PoI2).
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3.3 The Argument from Caution
The argument:
In the face of risky practical decisions between different actions,
an agent ought to be cautious. On average, in the face of risky
practical decisions, the credences given by c0 lead an agent to
make the most cautious choices. Therefore, (PoI2).
Jon Williamson proposes this argument, making precise what he means by
a risky decision and giving a measure of how cautious a particular set of
credences is [Williamson, 2007, §8].
One might object to this argument in the way that many object to the
Dutch Book argument for Probabilism: it is too limited in its scope. Prob-
abilism, if true, is true not only for an agent who knows she will meet a
Dutch Bookie. If true, it is true also for agents who do not know what
sort of decisions they will face, or who know that they will not encounter
a Dutch Bookie. But, the objection goes, the Dutch Book argument has
no power against such an agent. Similarly, the Principle of Indifference, if
true, is true for any agent, regardless of what she knows about the practical
decisions she’ll face; regardless of what she knows about how risky those
decisions will be. But, the objection goes, Williamson’s Argument from
Caution has no power against an agent who knows she will never face a
risky decision.
However, just as we can ‘depragmatize’ the Dutch Book argument for
Probabilism, so we can ’depragmatize’ the Argument from Caution.5 The
depragmatized Dutch Book argument says that an agent who violates Prob-
abilism is irrational because there are choices that lead to sure losses that
her credences will sanction, whether or not she will ever be in a position
to make those choices [Christensen, 1996]. Similarly, a depragmatized Ar-
gument from Caution says that an agent who violates the Principle of In-
difference is irrational because there are incautious choices in response to
risky decisions that her credences sanction, whether or not she will ever face
those decisions.
My concern with Dutch Book arguments and the Argument from Caution—
whether pragmatic or depragmatized—is that they identify only part of
what is wrong with an agent who violates the norm they seek to establish.
They establish that violating the norm has bad consequences for an agent’s
practical reasoning—she will make bad choices or she will be committed to
making bad choices between different actions. But violating these norms
seems to involve a failure of theoretical reason.6 Thus, if possible, we would
5Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me to consider this move.
6Having said that, [Skyrms, 1984, 21-26] and [Armendt, 1993] both present Dutch Book
arguments as dramatising failures of theoretical reason—they take themselves to be fol-
lowing Ramsey in this respect. But I share Vineberg’s concerns about these interpretations
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like to justify them in a way that appeals only to theoretical reason and
its goals. And, indeed, that is what the Argument from Evidential Support
and the Argument from Minimal Information seek to do. But I have argued
that both of these fail. Now, it may be simply impossible to provide such
a justification; there may be no purely cognitive justification available. In
that case, we would have discovered something interesting: these norms,
which seem to govern theoretical reason in the first place and practical rea-
son only secondarily, in fact govern practical reason in the first place and
theoretical reason only secondarily. But I claim that it is possible; and I will
argue for that by presenting the Argument from Accuracy, which attempts
to provide a purely cognitive justification for the Principle of Indifference.
Thus, I do not offer an objection to the Argument from Caution, but rather
a motivation for looking beyond to it to find a purely cognitive justification
for the Principle of Indifference.
4 Minimax and risk aversion
These, then, are the merits of the Argument from Accuracy: it appeals only
to the cognitive value of accuracy and is thus compatible with the parsimo-
nious and explanatorily powerful thesis of cognitive value monism; and
it is entirely non-pragmatic, so it reveals the purely cognitive reason for
obeying the Principle of Indifference. Its primary demerit is that it relies
on Minimax, which many will say is not a norm of rational choice. What,
then, can be said in favour of this assumption?
Let me begin by noting that, as I have stated it, Minimax has a very lim-
ited domain of application: it applies only at the beginning of an agent’s
credal life, before she has acquired any evidence and before she has as-
signed credences to the propositions she entertains; indeed, according to
the Argument from Accuracy, it is the norm that dictates how an agent
without credences ought to assign her initial credences. For an agent at
any other stage of her credal life, Minimax does not apply. Instead, in those
situations, the agent ought to maximise her subjective expected utility rela-
tive to the credences she has at that time (or perhaps her risk-weighted ex-
pected utility [Buchak, 2013]); and this will often lead to choices that Mini-
max would condemn as irrational (at least providing the risk weighting is
not extreme).
Thus, the version of Minimax to which I appeal is akin to the version
deployed by Rawls in A Theory of Justice [Rawls, 1975, Chapter III]. Agents
at the beginning of their life are in a credal version of the ‘original posi-
tion’; they behind a credal version of Rawl’s ‘veil of ignorance’. Just as a
Rawlsian agent must choose the society in which she will live in accordance
[Vineberg, 2001].
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with Minimax, I claim that a Lewisian superbaby ought to adopt her initial
credence function in accordance with that decision-theoretic principle.
However, while I may allay some fears about Minimax by noting the
weakness of the version to which I appeal, others remain. After all, there
are other putative decision-theoretic norms that purport to govern agents
who have yet to assign credences. The norm of (Dominance) to which Joyce
appeals is such a norm. And there are other putative norms of this sort
that are supposed to capture the rationality of risk-sensitive behaviour:
Minimax makes all but the most risk-averse behaviour irrational; Maxi-
max makes all but the most risk-seeking behaviour irrational. Minimax
demands that an agent ought to adopt credence function c0. Maximax de-
mands that she ought to adopt vw1 or vw2 , both of which achieve maximal
accuracy; the former at w1, the latter at w2. Why favour Minimax over
Maximax?
The answer, I think, lies in cognitive conservatism. As William James
noted,
“There are two ways of looking at our duty in the matter of
opinion,—ways entirely different, and yet ways about whose
difference the theory of knowledge seems hitherto to have shown
very little concern. We must know the truth; and we must avoid
error,—these are our first and great commandments as would-
be knowers.” [James, 1905, §VII]
But, as he also noted, these two laws are in tension. Which has the upper
hand in disputes? For the cognitive conservative, it is the latter; for the
cognitive radical, it is the former. I side with the conservative.
I have no argument for making this alliance. At this point, it seems to
me, we have reached normative bedrock: one cannot argue for cognitive
conservatism from more basic principles. Thus, to those who reject cog-
nitive conservatism—and it seems that James himself wished to do so—I
can only recommend the argument of this paper as an argument for the
following (subjunctive) conditional: Cognitive Conservatism ⇒ Principle
of Indifference.
In the accuracy framework that is the setting for Joyce’s argument and
mine, James’ “duty” to “know the truth” becomes the goal of having highly
accurate credences, and the “duty” to “avoid error” becomes the goal of
not having highly inaccurate credences. The tension to which James al-
ludes arises because, in a state of ignorance, one pursues the former goal
by having credences close to the omniscient credences at some possible
world, which are therefore highly accurate at that world; however, such
credences will be very far away from the omniscient credences at any other
possible world, and thus highly inaccurate there. So one can fully pursue
one goal only by ignoring the other. Our decision is thus whether to leave
open the possibility of “knowing the truth” (that is, being highly accurate)
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and thereby incurring a risk of being in “error” (that is, being highly in-
accurate); or ensure that we “avoid error” by having credences that are
not highly inaccurate at any world, but thereby preclude the possibility
of “knowing the truth”, since such credences will also not be highly accu-
rate at any world. Opting for the former—“knowing the truth”—amounts
to following a risk-seeking norm; opting for the latter—“avoid error”—
amounts to following a risk-averse norm.
Now, it follows from this that the cognitive conservative ought to adopt
a risk-averse norm. But it does not tell between the different risk-averse
norms that have been formulated. I will not attempt to consider all such
norms here. I only wish to note that, on one of the most plausible ri-
vals to Minimax—namely, Minimax Regret—the Argument from Accuracy
still goes through. I leave consideration of more sophisticated risk-averse
norms, such as various versions of the Hurwicz criterion, to another time.
The intuition behind Minimax Regret is this: What you ought to min-
imise is not the maximum disutility that you risk by choosing a particular
option, as Maximin demands; rather you ought to minimise the maximum
regret you risk, where the regret that attaches to an option at a world is
the difference between the maximum utility that attaches to some option at
that world and the utility of the option in question.7 Thus:
(Minimax Regret) Suppose O is a set of options, W is a set of
possible worlds, and U is a measure of the value of the options
in O at the worlds in W . Given an option o in O, define the
regret generated by choosing o at w to be the difference between
the maximum utility that could have been obtained by one of
the options at w and the utility of o at w:
RU(o, w) := max
o′ inO
U(o′, w)−U(o, w)
Suppose o, o′ in O. Then we say
(c) o worst-case regret-dominates o′ with respect to U if the maxi-
mum regret generated by choosing o is less than the maxi-
mum regret generated by picking o′. That is,
max
w inW
RU(o, w) < max
w inW
RU(o′, w)
Now suppose o, o′ in O and
(i) o worst-case regret-dominates o′
(ii) There is no o′′ inO such that o′′worst-case regret-dominates
o
7This decision-theoretic principle was first considered in [Savage, 1951].
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Then o′ is irrational.
Now, in many cases, the regret that attaches to an option o at a world w is
different from the disutility of o at w; and often that difference leads (Mini-
max) and (Minimax Regret) to rule out different options as irrational. How-
ever, in the case of credence functions, the maximum cognitive utility at a
world w is 0, for any w—this maximum is obtained uniquely by vw. Thus,
the regret that attaches to a credence function c at w is the difference be-
tween the maximum cognitive utility at w—which is 0, as we have just
seen—and −B(c, w). But this difference is, of course, B(c, w), which is the
cognitive disutility of c at w. Thus, the regret R−B(c, w) that attaches to c
at w is just the disutility B(c, w) of c at w. As a result, when the options in
question are credence functions and the utility function is an accuracy mea-
sure, (Minimax) and (Minimax Regret) rule out exactly the same options as
irrational. Thus, since (Minimax) entails (PoI2), so does (Minimax Regret).
5 Extending the Argument from Accuracy
So far, we have justified only a particular instance of the Principle of Indif-
ference, which says that an agent with no evidence and who has credence
in only two exclusive and exhaustive propositions ought to assign equal
credence to each of them. What is the general principle from which this
follows? In this section, we formulate a general version of the Principle of
Indifference, present the Argument from Accuracy in its favour, and then
see how we may strengthen it by weakening the first premise.
5.1 Generalizing the argument: expanding the algebra
As before, we seek a norm that governs superbabies. Such agents have ac-
quired no evidence and they wish to assign credences to the propositions
they entertain. Let F be the set of propositions that our agent entertains.
Thus, hitherto, we have assumed that F is the two-element set {A, B}.
Henceforth, we will assume that F forms a finite algebra of propositions—
thus, F is closed under all Boolean operations.8 Now let us say that the pos-
sible worlds relative to F are the classically consistent assignments of truth
values to the elements of F—denote the set of these worldsWF . These are
the different possibilities grained as finely as the propositions to which the
agent assigns credences will allow. Thus, in our example,WF = {w1, w2}
where
8Of course, {A, B} is not itself an algebra since it misses out the top and bottom elements
> and⊥. But Dominance already demands unique values for> (namely, 1) and⊥ (namely,
0). So Minimax does as well. Thus, given that Minimax demands c(A) = c(B) = 0.5
for an agent with credences only over {A, B}, we can infer that it demands c(>) = 1,
c(A) = c(B) = 0.5, and c(⊥) = 0 for an agent with credences over {>, A, B,⊥}.
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• w1(A) = true, w1(B) = false;
• w2(A) = false, w2(B) = true.
Since F is finite, so isWF .
With this in hand, we can state the version of the Principle of Indiffer-
ence I wish to justify: in the absence of any evidence, an agent’s credence
in a proposition ought to be the proportion of the possible worlds relative
to F at which that proposition is true. Thus, define the credence function
cF0 as follows: for all X in F
cF0 (X) :=
|{w inWF : w(X) = true}|
|{w inWF}|
Then we state the Principle of Indifference as follows:
(PoI) At the beginning of an agent’s credal life, if she entertains
only the propositions in F , it ought to be the case that her cre-
dence function is cF0 .
And here is the Argument from Accuracy that I propose in its favour:
(1) The cognitive value of a credence function is given by the negative of
its Brier score at that world.
(2) (Minimax)
(3) Theorem 3 For all credence functions c on F , if c 6= cF0 , then
max
w inWF
B(cF0 , w) < maxw inWF
B(c, w)
Therefore,
(4) (PoI)
Theorem 3 follows from Theorem 4, which we prove below.
5.2 Strengthening the argument: beyond the Brier score
The argument of the preceding section generalizes our earlier justification
to cover a much wider range of agents; now we strengthen that argument.
We can weaken premise (1) considerably and nonetheless retain our con-
clusion (PoI). As we will see, Theorem 3 still holds if we replace the Brier
score with any of a vast array of alternative measures of inaccuracy. Let’s
see what they are.
In this section, we fix F and drop the superscript on ‘cF0 ’, writing ‘c0’
in its place. In section 7, we will return to the fact that the credence func-
tion demanded by the Principle of Indifference is sensitive to the set F of
propositions that the agent entertains.
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5.2.1 Conditions on inaccuracy measures
What features do we require of a measure of inaccuracy? I will require
two. First, I suggest that the inaccuracy of a credence function at a world
ought to be blind to the content of the propositions for which that credence
function is defined. Thus, if I have credence only in 3 is prime and my
brother has credence only in 7 is prime and we each have credence 0.9 in
our respective proposition, then an inaccuracy measure ought to render us
equally accurate, since both propositions are true. Similarly, if we both have
credences in both propositions, but I have credence 0.9 in the former and
0.8 in the latter and my brother has 0.8 in the former and 0.9 in the latter,
then an inaccuracy measure ought to render us equally accurate, since both
are true. Thus, the inaccuracy of a credence function at a world ought to
depend on the pairs (c(X), vw(X)) of its credence in X together with the
omniscient credence in X, but not on the content of the propositions that
give rise to those pairs. I will, however, allow that an inaccuracy measure
can treat propositions of different strengths differently. That is, while an
inaccuracy measure must be blind to content, it need not be blind to logical
or modal strength. Let’s make all of this precise:
Suppose:
• c, d are credence functions defined on finite algebras F , G
respectively;
• w is a world inWF ; and u is a world inWG .
Now suppose that there is an isomorphism τ : F ∼= G such that,
for all X ∈ F ,
c(X) = d(τ(X)) and vw(X) = vu(τ(X))
Then it ought to be the case that c is exactly as inaccurate at w as
d is at u—that is, I(c, w) = I(d, u). We say that a function with
this property is egalitarian.9
Second, I suggest that an inaccuracy measure should make the follow-
ing true: there is no credence function c 6= c0 that is at least as accurate
as c0 at all possible worlds. We say that a function with this property ren-
ders indifference immodest. To justify this claim, we adapt an argument that
Jim Joyce has advanced in favour of a related requirement on inaccuracy
measures [Joyce, 2009, §9]. Our first pass at this argument is based on four
claims:
9The Brier score is egalitarian. So are all the inaccuracy measures generated by a certain
sort of scoring rule called a proper scoring rule. For more on proper scoring rules and the sort
of inaccuracy measures they generate, see [Predd et al., 2009].
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(1) There is a possible world at which c0 gives the chances of the propo-
sitions in F (this is a weak version of Joyce’s claim).
(2) If an agent knows the chances and nothing more, her credences should
match the chances (this is a version of Lewis’ Principal Principle).
(3) Accuracy is the sole cognitive virtue (this is cognitive value monism,
as discussed in section 2)
(4) If an option o is rationally permissible, and another option o′ has at
least as great utility as o at every world, then option o′ is rationally
permissible as well (this is a weak version of Dominance).
The argument then runs as follows:
By (1), there is a possible world at which c0 gives the objective
chances of the propositions in F . Thus, by (2), there is an evi-
dential situation such that c0 is the unique rational response to
that situation, namely, the situation in which an agent learns
that the objective chances are given by c0 (and learns nothing
more). Now, suppose it is the case that there is another cre-
dence function c such that c is at least as accurate as c0 at all
worlds. Then, since accuracy is the single fundamental virtue
of credence functions (3), c has at least as great cognitive utility
as c0 at every world. So, by (4), it would be rationally permis-
sible to adopt c rather than c0 in the situation in question. But,
by assumption, this is not the case—c0 is the unique rational
response to the evidence. Therefore, there is no such credence
function c, as required.
Of course, one might wonder why a weak version of Dominance is ap-
propriate as premise (4). Should we not appeal to a version of Minimax
instead? But note that the evidential situation in which c0 is the unique ra-
tional response is not the evidential situation of a superbaby—it is a situa-
tion in which the agent has acquired considerable evidence. And Minimax,
we have noted above, applies only to superbabies.
Alan Ha´jek has criticised assumption (1) as it appears in Joyce’s original
argument [Ha´jek, 2008, 814]. He objects that, depending on the content of
the propositions in F , it may be that c0 could not be the chance function of
any world. For instance, F may contain propositions to which chances can-
not be ascribed: moral propositions, aesthetic propositions, mathematical
propositions, or propositions about the chances themselves. Any of these
may be appropriate objects of belief, but not propositions to which chances
might be ascribed.
However, we can answer this objection as follows. We replace (1) by:
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(1a) For any finite algebra F , there is a finite algebra G and an isomor-
phism τ : F ∼= G such that, if we define d0(·) := c0(τ−1(·)), then d0
gives the chances of the propositions in G at some world.
(1b) Inaccuracy measures ought to be egalitarian.
(1a) says that, although the content of the propositions in F might pre-
vent c0 on F from being a chance function, there is always an isomorphic
algebra G such that the isomorphic copy d0 of c0 on G could be a chance
function. Thus, by (2), there is an evidential situation that demands d0.
And thus there must be no d defined on G such that I(d, u) ≤ I(d0, u) for
all worlds u ∈ WG . But, by (1b), since I is egalitarian, we have that there
is no c defined on F such that I(c, w) ≤ I(c0, w) for all worlds w ∈ WF , as
required.
So how do we justify (1a)? Suppose F is an algebra and |WF | = n.
Then consider the following n exclusive and exhaustive propositions: This
n-sided die will land on 1, This n-sided die will land on 2, . . . , This n-sided die
will land on n. Let G be the algebra generated by these propositions. And
let τ be an isomorphism between F and G. Then let d0(·) := c0(τ−1(·)).
How do we know that d0 is the chance function at some world? We know
there is a possible world at which the n-sided die in question is fair. At that
world, d0 gives the chances. Thus, from (1a), (1b), (2), and (3), it follows
that our inaccuracy measure ought to render indifference immodest.10
However, there is another concern with this argument: it arises because
we appealed to the Principal Principle in (2) and cognitive value monism
in (3). But the Principal Principle seems to be an evidentialist norm, and
one might worry that cognitive value monism cannot justify it. However,
as [Pettigrew, 2013] shows, this is not the case: there is an accuracy-based
argument for the Principal Principle that has the same structure as Joyce’s
argument for Probabilism and the Argument from Accuracy for the Princi-
ple of Indifference that I am defending here. So it is not at odds with the
version of cognitive value monism defended here, namely, veritism.
5.2.2 The Argument from Accuracy strengthened
Thus, we require that an inaccuracy measure should be egalitarian and that
it should render indifference immodest. Theorem 4 below shows that, for
any such inaccuracy measure, c0 is the only credence function that min-
imises maximum inaccuracy. Roughly, the reason is this: First, since I
is egalitarian and F is an algebra, c0 is equally inaccurate at all possible
worlds relative to F . Thus, c0 obtains its maximum inaccuracy at every
world. Second, since I renders indifference immodest, if c 6= c0, then there
10Again, the Brier score renders indifference immodest, as does any inaccuracy measure
generated by a proper scoring rule. For a proof, see [Predd et al., 2009, §6].
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is some world at which c is more inaccurate than c0. Since c0 obtains its
maximum inaccuracy at that world (as it does at every world), it follows
that the maximum inaccuracy of c is greater than that of c0. So (Minimax)
rules out c as irrational. More formally:
Theorem 4 Suppose I is egalitarian and renders indifference immodest. Then, for
all credence functions c on F , if c 6= c0, then
max
w inWF
I(c0, w) < max
w inWF
I(c, w)
Proof. We begin by proving that, if I is egalitarian, then, for any
w, w′ inWF ,
I(c0, w) = I(c0, w′)
We will show that, for any w, w′ in WF , there is an automor-
phism τ : F ∼= F such that
c0(X) = c0(τ(X)) and vw(X) = vw′(τ(X))
Define τ as follows: Represent propositions as sets of possible
worlds. Then define the following permutation on the set of
possible worlds WF : τ swaps w and w′ and leaves everything
else fixed. Then, finally, define the following automorphism on
F :
τ(X) := {τ(w) : w ∈ X}.
Then τ has the required properties, since |{w ∈ WF : w(X) =
true}| = |{w ∈ WF : w(τ(X)) = true}|. So, since I is egalitar-
ian, we have I(c0, w) = I(c0, w′).
Now, since I renders indifference immodest, it follows that, for
every credence function c, there is a world w ∈ WF such that c
is more inaccurate than c0 at w: that is, I(c0, w) < I(c, w). But,
by the previous result, it follows that, for any world w′ ∈ WF ,
c is more inaccurate at w than c0 is at w′: that is, I(c0, w′) =
I(c0, w) < I(c, w). So it follows that
max
w inWF
I(c0, w) < max
w inWF
I(c, w)
as required. 2
This gives us an extremely general version of the Argument from Accu-
racy. It establishes the Principle of Indifference for agents with credences in
propositions that form a finite algebra. And it assumes only two plausible
properties of inaccuracy measures, as well as the decision-theoretic norm
of Minimax.
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6 Other norms
Having completed our argument for the Principle of Indifference, we ask
how this norm interacts with other Bayesian norms that are taken to govern
superbabies. These are: Probabilism, Regularity, and the Principal Princi-
ple.
6.1 (PoI) and Probabilism
Probabilism is the following norm:
(Prob) At any time in an agent’s credal life, it ought to be the
case that her credence function c at that time is a probability
function. That is,
• c(>) = 1; c(⊥) = 0;
• c(X ∨Y) = c(X) + c(Y) for all exclusive X and Y.
Like (Prob2), (Prob) applies to an agent at any time during her credal life.
Let (Probsb) be the version of (Prob) that applies only to superbabies—that
is, it demands only that an agent’s initial credence function be a probability
function. Then the relationship between (PoI) and (Probsb) is straightfor-
ward: (PoI) ⇒ (Probsb). After all, the proportion of worlds in which a
tautology is true is 1, and the proportion in which a contradiction is true is
0; furthermore, the proportion of worlds in which X ∨ Y is true is just the
sum of the proportion in which X is true with the proportion in which Y is
true, providing X and Y are exclusive. So c0 is a probability function. Thus,
by justifying (PoI), we thereby justify (Probsb).
6.2 (PoI) and Regularity
Regularity is the following norm (cf., for instance, [Kemeny, 1955]):
(Reg) At the beginning of an agent’s credal life, it ought to be
that her credence function c is regular. That is,
• For all X 6≡ ⊥, c(X) > 0.
Again, (PoI)⇒ (Reg). After all, if X 6≡ ⊥, then there is some world inWF
at which X is true. Thus, the proportion of worlds in which X is true is
positive.
Thus, as well as an argument for the Principle of Indifference, the Argu-
ment from Accuracy gives a novel argument for Regularity as well. Some
existing arguments for Regularity note that, if an agent violates it and up-
dates by conditioning, there are certain propositions they could never come
to learn. Thus, they attribute the irrationality of violating Regularity to the
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trouble it stores up for a possible future. The Argument from Accuracy,
by contrast, attributes this irrationality to the trouble it makes at the time
the irregular initial credence function is held. The trouble in question is
that such a credence function risks greater inaccuracy than it is necessary
to risk.
6.3 (PoI) and the Principal Principle
The Principal Principle is a chance-credence norm [Lewis, 1980]. That is, it
governs the relationship between your credences in propositions concern-
ing chances and your credences in other propositions. Like David Lewis, I
will take the Principal Principle to govern only superbabies. Consider such
a superbaby. Suppose that amongst the propositions this agent considers
are ones concerning what we shall call a heady coin. We say that a coin is
heady iff the chance of the coin landing heads is either 60% or 90%. How
strongly ought this agent to believe the following proposition: The heady
coin will land heads? Lewis’ Principal Principle says the following:
c(Heads) = (0.6× c(Chance of heads is 60%))+ (0.9× c(Chance of heads is 90%))
More generally:
(PP) Let C be the set of probability functions that might give the
chances. For each ch in C, let Cch be the proposition ch gives the
chances. Then, at the beginning of her credal life, an agent ought
to have a credence function c such that
c(X) = ∑
ch∈C
c(Cch)ch(X)
for all X in the domain of the chance functions.11
That is, an agent’s initial credence in a proposition ought to match her ini-
tial expectation of its chance.
This seems plausible. The problem is that (PP) and (PoI) are incompat-
ible. Consider the example of the superbaby considering the heady coin:
C = {ch1, ch2}, where ch1(Heads) = 0.6 and ch2(Heads) = 0.9, and
F = {Cch1 & Heads, Cch1 & Tails, Cch2 & Heads, Cch2 & Tails}
Then (PoI) demands c(Heads) = 0.5, while (PP) demands 0.6 ≤ c(Heads) ≤
0.9. How, then can we resolve this tension between these two plausible
principles?
11In fact, this is strictly weaker than Lewis’ original version. It is Jenann Ismael’s for-
mulation restricted to the agent’s initial credence functions [Ismael, 2008]. It will serve our
purposes best here.
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At this point, the Argument from Accuracy might provide a solution.
I don’t offer this as the only solution available; but, as we will see, it has
plausible consequences. As we saw, it turns on (Minimax), which says:
(Minimax) Suppose o, o′ in O and
(i) o worst-case dominates o′
(ii) There is no o′′ in O such that o′′ worst-case dominates o
Then o′ is irrational.
In the Argument from Accuracy presented above, we took O to be the set
of all possible credence functions on the algebra F of propositions about
which the agent has an opinion. (Minimax) then says of every credence
function except c0 that it is irrational. But, if there are other norms in play—
such as the Principal Principle—perhaps we ought to restrict O to the set
of all credence functions that obey those other norms. Thus, we might first
restrict to the credence functions that obey (PP); and then ask for the one
amongst those that minimises its maximum inaccuracy. If c0 obeys (PP), then
it is mandated. But if, as in the example, c0 does not obey (PP), then some
other credence function is sanctioned. Let’s see this in action in the example
above.
For any credence function that satisfies (PP) in this situation, there is
0 ≤ x ≤ 1 such that
c(Cch1) = x
c(Cch2) = 1− x
c(Heads) = 0.6c(Cch1) + 0.9c(Cch2) = 0.9− 0.3x
c(Tails) = 0.4c(Cch1) + 0.1c(Cch2) = 0.1 + 0.3x
We can then calculate the Brier score at each of the four possible worlds in
WF , namely,
w1 = Cch1 & Heads, w2 = Cch1 & Tails, w3 = Cch2 & Heads, w4 = Cch2 & Tails
This gives:
B(c, w1) = 2(0.1 + 0.3x)2 + 2(1− x)2
B(c, w2) = 2(0.9− 0.3x)2 + 2(1− x)2
B(c, w3) = 2(0.1 + 0.3x)2 + 2x2
B(c, w4) = 2(0.9− 0.3x)2 + 2x2
Then define the following credence function:
c∗(Cch1) = 0.5 c
∗(Cch2) = 0.5 c
∗(Heads) = 0.75 c∗(Tails) = 0.25
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Then, if c 6= c∗ and c satisfies (PP), we have
max
1≤i≤4
B(c∗, wi) < max
1≤i≤4
B(c, wi)
Thus, if we apply Minimax to the set of credence functions that satisfy (PP)
in this case, it says of every one of those credence functions except c∗ that
it is irrational. Thus, we ought to adopt c∗ in that situation. That is, in
the absence of evidence, we ought to be indifferent between the chance
hypotheses, and then appeal to (PP) to set the other credences.
Interestingly, this result is sensitive to the composition of the setF . Sup-
pose F = {Heads, Tails}. And suppose that, although she has no credences
in Cch1 and Cch2 , our agent does nonetheless know that one or other is true.
Now, our original formulation of (PP) applied only to agents who have
credences in the chance hypotheses. But it seems reasonable to drop this
requirement and say not that an agent ought to have an initial credence
function that satisfies (PP), but that she ought to have an initial credence
function that can be extended to a credence function that satisfies (PP). This de-
mand does not require her to have credences in the chance hypotheses.
Thus, for an agent who knows that either Cch1 or Cch2 is true but for whom
F = {Heads, Tails}, she satisfies this more general version of (PP) iff there
is 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 such that
c(Heads) = 0.9− 0.3x
c(Tails) = 0.1 + 0.3x
NowWF = {w1 = Heads, w2 = Tails}. Thus, we have the following Brier
scores:
B(c, w1) = 2(0.1 + 0.3x)2
B(c, w2) = 2(0.9− 0.3x)2
And the credence function that minimises its maximum inaccuracy is c†
defined as follows:
c†(Heads) = 0.6 c†(Tails) = 0.4
That is, c† = ch1. Thus, if F includes chance hypotheses and we apply
(Minimax) to the credence functions that satisfy (PP), we get that our cre-
dence in Heads oughts to be 0.75. On the other hand, if F leaves out the
chance hypotheses and we apply (Minimax) to the credence functions that
can be extended to ones that satisfy (PP), our credence in Heads ought to
be 0.6.
On reflection, this seems right. If we care only about the accuracy of
our credences in the non-modal propositions, we ought to set those cre-
dences as near as possible to those demanded by c0. In the example under
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consideration, that means assigning all weight to Cch1—indeed, we set our
credences equal to c† = ch1. However, if we also care about the accuracy of
our credences in the chance hypotheses, such a strong weighting towards
Cch1 is risky, since it will be maximally inaccurate if ch2 turns out to give
the true chances and Cch2 is true. Thus, we ought to assign each chance
hypothesis equal credence and set our credences in Heads and Tails as (PP)
demands—the resulting credence function is c∗.
However, this merely shifts the question, which now becomes: Should
we care about the accuracy of our credence in the chance hypotheses? I
would say that we should. They are, after all, simply claims about the way
the world is, just like Heads and Tails. Just because they are modal claims
concerning chance, this should not deprive the accuracy of credences in
them of cognitive value. Thus, we should adopt c∗.
Interestingly, this gives a different solution to this problem from that
given by Jon Williamson [Williamson, 2007]. For Williamson, we ought to
adopt c†. For him, our credences in the non-modal propositions ought to
be as close as possible to c0, where distance is measured by cross-entropy.
The preceding considerations tell against this view.
Williamson might respond as follows: We are only interested in chance
hypotheses to the extent that they inform our credences in the non-modal
propositions. So we are only interested in the accuracy of the chance hy-
potheses to the extent that it affects the accuracy of our credences in the
non-modal propositions. Thus, we ought to seek the credence function over
the non-modal propositions that minimises maximum inaccuracy. Perhaps,
but I’m not convinced. Of course, it may be that, for pragmatic reasons, we
are only interested in the non-modal facts—perhaps all of our choices are
ultimately made on the basis of our credences in the non-modal proposi-
tions, so it is only their accuracy that has pragmatic value. But we are not
interested here in the pragmatic value of accuracy beliefs. We are interested
in their cognitive value. And then we have no reason to consider only the
non-modal propositions and our credences in them.
7 The consistency of (PoI)
In the preceding sections, I have presented a novel justification of the Prin-
ciple of Indifference. However, it might be objected that this putative norm
is inconsistent and thus unjustifiable. In this section, I take up this objec-
tion.
To appreciate the alleged inconsistency, consider an agent at the begin-
ning her credal life who entertains only two propositions: Red says that the
handkerchief in my pocket is red; Blue says that it is blue; the agent knows
that Red and Blue are exclusive and exhaustive. The Principle of Indiffer-
ence demands of such an agent that she assign credence 12 to each proposi-
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tion. However, suppose instead that she entertains credences in only three
propositions, namely, Red, Light Blue, and Dark Blue, which she knows to
be exclusive and exhaustive. Then the Principle of Indifference demands
of her that she assign credence 13 to each proposition. Thus, the Principle of
Indifference makes inconsistent demands: it demands that c(Red) = 12 and
it demands that c(Red) = 13 . It is impossible to satisfy both demands. Thus,
it is impossible to satisfy the Principle of Indifference. Thus, this principle
is not a norm (by the meta-normative ought-can principle) and thus cannot
be justified.
The problem with this objection is that it mistakes the content of the
Principle of Indifference. The principle does not demand of every agent that
she assign credence 12 to Red in the absence of evidence; nor does it demand
of every agent that she assign credence 13 to Red in the absence of evidence.
Rather, as was made clear in our statement of (PoI) above, the credence it
demands an agent assign to Red in the absence of evidence depends on the
set F of propositions to which she assigns credences.
• If F = {Red, Blue}, then cF0 (Red) = 12 and this is the credence that
(PoI) demands of our agent.
• If F = {Red, Light Blue, Dark Blue}, then cF0 (Red) = 13 and this is the
credence that (PoI) demands.
Thus, there is no inconsistency.
The point is that the credence that the Principle of Indifference demands
a superbaby assign to a particular proposition depends on the other propo-
sitions to which she assigns credences. At first, this may seem implausible,
but I submit that it is entirely appropriate. After all, intuitively, the Prin-
ciple of Indifference demands that we divide our credences equally over
the possibilities. But which possibilities? Not all of the genuine metaphys-
ical possibilities, since we cannot expect a superbaby to be aware of all of
these—that would require a posteriori knowledge. Thus, the possibilities
over which we demand that an agent divide her credences equally must
be more limited or more coarse-grained than this. But we might nonethe-
less require that whatever these coarse-grained possibilities are, they must
respect the ‘true symmetries’ of the situation in the way that one might
think the possible worlds relative to F = {Red, Blue} do, while the pos-
sible worlds relative to F = {Red, Light Blue, Dark Blue} do not. Again,
however, to demand that is to demand too much. After all, the true sym-
metries of the situation—like the genuine metaphysical possibilities—can
only be known a posteriori. So we cannot demand of a superbaby that she
set her credences in accordance with them. Instead, we demand that a su-
perbaby divide her credence equally over the possibilities grained as finely
as the propositions she entertains will allow: that is, a possibility in this context
is way of consistently assigning truth values to all the propositions that the
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agent entertains; in other words, it is a possible world relative to the set F
of propositions she entertains; that is, it is an element ofWF . So of course
if an agent entertains Red, Light Blue, and Dark Blue, there are three pos-
sibilities over which she must divide her credences; but if she entertains
only Red and Blue, there are just two. So the Principle of Indifference will
make different demands on her depending on the set of propositions she
entertains.
8 Conclusion
We have presented a novel argument for the Principle of Indifference. The
Argument from Accuracy says that an agent who fails to divide their cre-
dences equally over the possibilities is irrational because she risks greater
inaccuracy than she needs to. The argument does not appeal to any mea-
sure of evidential support; nor does it require us to say what is so bad
about going beyond the information contained in our evidence. Moreover,
it is a non-pragmatic argument: it appeals only to the cognitive value of
credal states; it does not appeal to the pragmatic values of the choices that
a credal state might lead us to make. In these ways, it avoids the problems
with existing arguments for the Principle of Indifference.
The present formulation of the Principle of Indifference and the justi-
fication provided are restricted to agents with credences in only finitely
many propositions. What happens in the infinite case? This is far from
clear. Of course, we know that the most natural formulation of the Princi-
ple of Indifference is incompatible with Countable Additivity: If A1, A2, . . .
is a countable partition, the Principle of Indifference demands that c(A1) =
c(A2) = . . ., while Countable Additivity demands that ∑i c(Ai) = 1; and
it is easy to see that these demands cannot both be satisfied. Further-
more, Bertrand’s paradoxes [Bertrand, 1889] and van Fraassen’s cube fac-
tory example [van Fraassen, 1989] pose problems for the Principle of Indif-
ference on continuous probability spaces. What’s more, it is no longer so
straightforward to define inaccuracy measures for credence functions over
infinitely many propositions. The definition of the Brier score does not ex-
tend naturally to infinite sets. How we might adapt the Argument from
Accuracy to shed light on these puzzles is work for the future.
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